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Abstract
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nal outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and
on the informational problems towards the e¤orts involved. The positive e¤ect that the
e¤ort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred
solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conicts between partners.
This paper shows how two di¤erent structures of partnership governance (a centralized,
and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply
of non-contractible e¤orts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project
closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either
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ts, or from public funds. I derive conditions
under which public intervention is optimal.
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1 Introduction
Why do prot rms collaborate with universities in less applied research projects? Why
do universities collaborate with rms in less basic research projects? Firms and universi-
ties belong to di¤erent institutional settings, with di¤erent approaches and objectives when
conducting research (Dasgupta & David, 1994). Through research, rms aim to obtain prof-
itable discoveries that increase the quality of their goods and services or their productivity, or
that reduce their production costs (European Commission, 2004). For universities, however,
research is the mean to fulll their "commitment to society to create and sustain knowledge"
(Argyres & Liebeskind, 1998). Despite these divergences in research goals, recent trends in
partnerships show an increasing importance of research collaborations between rms and
universities (NSF, 2006; Caloghirou et al., 2001).1 The main reason for such trend relies on
the recognition of mutual benets from this type of interaction. To my knowledge, the type
of research projects that may arise under collaboration of institutionally di¤erent parties,
however, has not received a satisfactory explanation in the literature.2 The present paper
contributes with a new possible answer to this puzzling question, by showing that the out-
come of a partnership agreement may optimally derive from a contract between the partners.
The main point of the argument is that the characteristics of a collaborative research can act
as an incentive tool for non-contractible resources (hereafter named e¤orts). The choice of
a research project closer to the interests of one of the parties, motivates a higher allocation
of e¤ort from that party, thus increasing the expected benet of collaborating. The analy-
sis also emphasizes how the collaboration outcome depends on the structure of partnership
governance, by comparing a centralized decision making process, to a decentralized one. Be-
sides expanding the study of business and science links, the theory developed in this paper
contributes to a deeper understanding of the organization of research activities.
In the most recent decades, special attention has been dedicated to collaborative research
between rms and universities. The reason for this special interest lays in the recognition of
potential benets and costs from this interaction.
Several empirical studies document the benets accruing to rms that have universities
as research partners (e.g., Lee, 2000; Caloghirou et al., 2001; Schartinger et al., 2001; Belder-
bos et al., 2004; Veugelers & Cassiman, 2005). The common factor in these studies is the
recognition that cooperation with universities represents the access to a pool of highly qual-
1Refering to US alliances registered at the US Department of Justice, the Cooperative Research (CORE)
database recorded a signicative increase of RJVs having at least one university as a partner (NSF, 2006):
6% in 1985 (3 RJVs in a total of 50), towards 15% in 2003 (133 RJVs in a total of 913). In Europe, under
the rst four Framework Programmes of the European Union, the percentage of RJVs with at least one
university as partner, increased from 56% in 1983, 5 RJVs out of 9, towards 67% in 1996, 938 out of 1401
(Caloghirou et al., 2001).
2Some possible explanations, maybe complementaries of mine, can be found in Rosenberg (1990).
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ied scientists, in a wide range of disciplines. These portfolios of knowledge and technology
become especially relevant to rms, as societies become more developed and consumers more
demanding. The need to accomplish with sophistication of the markets as a way to maintain
performance is, in fact, one of the most plausible causes for the recent trends in the research
strategy of the rms.3
From the universities perspective, it is also possible to capitalize benets from cooperating
with rms. First, companies provide an extra source of monetary funds for universities.
With the outrunning of public available resources for the universities, the importance of
this funding component increases (Rosenberg, 2003; and Nowotny et al., 2003). Second, the
access to companiesdata, equipment, and market experience also benets academicsown
research. Firmsskills and resources are excellent tools to test existing theories, or to have
insights for the development of new theories (Lee, 2000).
From a more general perspective, several empirical evidence register a higher probability
of achieving valuable outcomes from research, when entrepreneurs and academics work to-
gether (e.g., Lambert, 2003; Zucker & Darby, 1995; Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Balconi
& Laboranti, 2006).
Advantages of collaboration, however, come at a cost, which often hinders the relation
between rms and universities. As Dasgupta & David (1994) remark, rms (belonging to the
Realm of Technology) and universities (belonging to the Republic of Science) have di¤erent
cultures, goals, norms of behavior and reward systems. Distinct socioeconomic rules lead to
di¤erent approaches and objectives when conducting research. On the one hand, universities
primary concern is to contribute for the advancement of knowledge. Activities of research
developed with this goal, dene what is known in the literature as basic research (OECD,
2002). On the other hand, the purpose of rms when doing research is to nd concrete
solutions for practical problems, thus pursuing what is identied as applied research (OECD,
2002). According to existing empirical evidence (e.g., Hall et al., 2001; Siegel, 1999; Hall,
1999; Brainard, 1999; Schartinger et al., 2001), these distinct institutional settings and,
especially, the distinct objectives towards research, are a natural source of obstacles for the
interaction of business and science.
The framework in this paper builds on the two phenomena just described: collaboration
between rms and universities is benecial, since it increases the probability of obtaining
a valuable research outcome for both partners; but divergence in research goals may raise
tensions in the agreement. Under these premises, I analyze how the characteristics of col-
3From the beginning of the last century until 1980s, the most successful innovative rms were making
(all) their in-house research at their (big) corporate laboratories, (e.g. General Electrics, AT&T, Kodak,
Xerox, IBM). In the past two decades, however, the tendency has been towards an increased cooperation
with other institutions, in particularly, with universities (Lambert, 2003; Audretsch et al., 2002; Hall et al.,
2001).
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laboration change in two dimensions: the structure of the partnership governance, and the
informational constraints of who has the authority over the decision making process. In
terms of partnership governance, I compare two structures, a centralized one and a decen-
tralized one. Under a centralized structure, an entity representing the aggregate interests
of both collaborators, the Consortium, is responsible for deciding the characteristics of the
common project, and the amount of resources that each party shall employ. Under a decen-
tralized structure, one of the parties is empowered to make those decisions. For each of these
two structures of governance, I consider alternative informational scenarios that di¤er with
respect to the veriability of e¤orts, thus creating or not a moral-hazard problem. I start
with a benchmark where both partners contribute with veriable e¤orts (no moral-hazard).
I then analyze how the characteristics of the common project change, when e¤orts become
non-veriable to the decision-maker (moral-hazard from one or both partners).
The main results of this paper show that, although a decentralized decision-maker always
prefers a project closer to its own interests (comparing with the choice of a Consortium),
both types of governance may use the type of research as an incentive tool for e¤ort. This
incentive mechanism means that, when the e¤ort of one of the parties, say, the University is
non-veriable, the other party, the Firm, may nd optimal to collaborate in a less applied
project. With such less applied research, scientists of the University are willing to exert
higher e¤ort in the joint project. This higher involvement makes a success more likely,
increasing the expected benet also of the Firm. Nevertheless, the use of the type of project
as an incentive mechanism must satisfy two requirements. First, a successful project should
have a su¢ ciently high market value for the Firm, when comparing with the scientic value
that a success brings to the University. Second, the e¤ort of the University should be
su¢ ciently relevant for the success of the project. By a similar reasoning, when the Firm
contributes to the joint project with non-veriable e¤ort, it may also be optimal for the
University to collaborate in a more applied research project.
This incentive argument o¤ers an alternative explanation for the evidence that rms and
universities tend to collaborate in more basic research projects (Caloghirou, 2001; Veugelers
& Cassiman, 2005). Some authors, e.g., Rosenberg (1990), justify the involvement of rms in
collaborative projects of basic research, as an long-term investment to acquire complementary
knowledge. Ultimately, they argue, this investment would bring some insights on how to
better conduct and evaluate rmsown research. The present paper shows another possible
justication for the interest of rms in collaborative basic research: it is a tool to motivate
the supply of e¤ort of the universities, whenever this e¤ort is su¢ ciently important to obtain
a successful valuable outcome.
The predictions of my model also o¤er insights with managerial and policy relevant
implications. From the perspective of management, this paper emphasizes the importance
of committing to a project that aligns the interests of the parties involved in the collaboration.
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The ex-ante commitment on the project is specially valuable, whenever they can not commit
on the resources to employ. By choosing a project whose characteristics are closer to the
interest of the parties, their motivation to collaborate is higher and, thus, is more likely to
obtain a successful result.
At the level of the internal organization of research, in rms, it is also possible to derive
some managerial implications of my results. In order to motivate highly qualied scientists
for the Firms projects, the Firm may give to those scientists the possibility to continue
publishing and to use the results of research in their own scientic agenda. This argument
is consistent with the results of Cockburn & Henderson (1998), who nd evidence that
rewarding researchers in rms, on the basis of their standing in the public rank hierarchy, is
associated with rms being more productive than their rivals.
From a policy perspective, this paper stresses the benets of promoting both a centralized
partnership governance, and veriability of the resources involved in the common project.
When the moral-hazard problem from at least one of the partners is the reason for a less
e¢ cient collaboration, it may be socially desirable to increase the reward of a successful
project, using public funds. The conditions for the optimality of such policy intervention
rely, on the one hand, on a high expected gain from the partnership and a high relevance of
the non-contractible resources to realize such gain, and on the other hand, on the low cost
of the public funds.
The theory of this paper relates to three main branches of literature. First, my results
have some features of research partnership literature that shows the e¢ ciency gains of co-
operation in R&D, in the presence of spillovers and low degree of competition (e.g., Spence,
1984; Katz, 1986; DAspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; De Bondt, 1996).
Classifying as a spillover the positive externality of the e¤ort of a partner on the expected
benet of the other partner, my results are aligned with this literature. In fact, I empha-
size, rst, that collaborating is preferred to developing research alone, and second, that a
centralized structure of governance delivers a more e¢ cient outcome than a decentralized
one. In contrast with this stream of work, I consider that there exists only one phase of
interaction between partners, and that all benets from collaboration accrue to the part-
ners. Furthermore, I take into account the peculiarities of rms and universities interaction,
namely di¤erences in research goals, and the tensions that can arise due to these divergences.
Second, my paper relates to the literature of moral-hazard problems in teams (e.g., Holm-
strom, 1982). As in this literature, I emphasize the ine¢ ciency in the allocation of resources,
when individually decided by team members. Nevertheless, we di¤erentiate on the main
suggestion to reduce the moral-hazard impact. This branch of literature emphasizes the role
of the principal and a non-balanced budget, to ensure that agentsdecisions are aligned with
the e¢ cient ones. In the present paper, I use the capacity to commit on the characteristics
of project, as the mechanism to motivate agents for a higher e¤ort (closer, but not neces-
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sarily equal, to the e¢ cient level). Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo (1993) also analyze a
moral-hazard problem, considering a principal-agent model with several agents. As in my
setting, the structure of incentives aims to elicit cooperation between agents, since it yields
more e¢ cient outcomes. Nevertheless, we di¤er on the main incentive mechanism used to
reduce moral-hazard ine¢ ciencies. Their focus is on how the capacity of the group to commit
on non-veriable variables, such as e¤ort and mutual help, can motivate agents to a higher
involvement. My focus is on how the proximity of the qualitative characteristics of the ac-
tivity towards the interests of the agents (the partners) can be the mechanism enhancing the
e¤orts. Moreover, while in Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo (1993) the interest of the agents
are aligned, in mine they are divergent, thus creating a trade-o¤ when the decision-maker
faces double moral-hazard.
Third, a more recent branch of literature focuses on business and science interaction,
emphasizing their institutional di¤erences, Aghion et al. (2005) and Lacetera (2006). As
in my paper, Lacetera (2006) focuses on the distinct goals of each institution: rms seek
economic prots, while universities are interested in scientically valuable knowledge. Sim-
ilarly to my result, a higher level of e¤ort translates in a larger probability of a successful
outcome. Nevertheless, Lacetera (2006) does neither consider a collaborative scenario where
both, rm and university, interact, nor does he consider the existence of informational prob-
lems in the interaction. Instead, he analyzes the outsourcing of a project to academia as
a commitment of the rm not to terminate a project before its completion. That commit-
ment motivates scientistse¤ort. Aghion et al. (2005) also discuss the best allocation of
a project between academia and the private sector, based on their institutional di¤erences.
Their main argument emphasizes the control rights over research decisions, with scientists
praising their freedom in research, and the directness of private sector conveying a disutility
for researchers. As a result, academia should develop projects with smaller market value.
My main question di¤ers from these two previous works. Considering business and science
as di¤erent institutions with their own established features, I analyze the characteristics of
a simultaneous interaction. Rather than studying who develops a project, I ask what kind
of project is developed by both.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the theoretical setting of
the model, with the objective functions of both Firm and University, and the characteristics
of the collaboration. In Section 3, I explain the collaboration equilibrium outcomes under a
centralized partnership governance as well as under a decentralized one, and I compare the
outcomes of these two structures. In Section 4, I discuss a policy intervention to support
the collaboration through subsidies. In Section 5, I interpret the results of the model and I
address their managerial and policy implications. Conclusion remarks are in Section 6. All
the proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Firms and universities have di¤erent organizational settings and goals towards the production
of knowledge. Consider a representative member of each community, namely one university
(identied as the University) and one rm (identied as the F irm). When developing a
project, the University seeks to contribute for the existent stock of knowledge. Following
the literature, basic research is dened as the set of theoretical and experimental research
activities aiming to advance knowledge (OECD, 2002). For the Firm, however, the interest
of research relies on the potential applications that can be derived from the new discoveries.
Let applied research be the production of knowledge with the purpose of meeting a specic
recognized need. Stressing the di¤erence between these two research approaches, I represent
them as opposite extremes of a line, as Figure 1a shows.
Applied
Research
Basic
Research
Figure 1a: Applied Research and Basic Research.
A research project is identied by a point in this line, representing a combination of
both goals. The outcome of a project is either a success or a failure. For the Firm, a
successful project translates into an invention with market value, VF . The Firm receives
all the benets from the market value of the new discovery. For the University, a success
represents a scientic publication with a certain scientic value, VU . The scientic value
of the discovery, hence of the publication, determines the reward of the University. Both
values, VF and VU , depend on how applied (or symmetrically, how basic) is the research.
For simplicity, I consider the preferences of the two parties, Firm and University, towards
the type of project, as single-peaked. Considering the two most preferred projects (one for
each party), I normalize the distance between them to one. I then identify each party with
its most preferred project, respectively, at 0 and 1. Figure 1b represents the normalization.
Applied
Research
Basic
Research
VF VU
0 1
Firm University
Figure 1b: Normalization of the values of a successful project.
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Since, in reality, Firms interests are closer to applied research and Universitys to basic
research, these new extremes of the line are the most applied and most basic projects that
are now relevant. Figure 1c represents the new project domain.
Firm’s
Applied Research
University’s
Basic Research
0 1
Figure 1c: Relevant range of research projects.
A point x 2 [0; 1] in this new (shorter) line describes the type of a research project. x
represents the relative importance of the basic research features of the project, and (1  x)
the relative importance of its applied characteristics. Since, by denition of the line, the
highest possible benet for the Firm comes from project x = 0; and for the University from
project x = 1; it is possible to dene the market and the scientic values of all the projects
in the range as follows:
VF (x) = Bf  mfx; (1)
VU(x) = Bu  mu (1  x) ; (2)
where Bi represents the highest possible value of a success, for party i (i = f; u), and the
slope mi indicates the marginal loss that i incurs when developing a research project that is
farther from its most preferred option. I consider 1  Bi <1 and mi 2 (0; 1) : The value of
mi can also reect the distance between the research goals of the Firm and the University.
The closer the interests, the smaller the value of mi. Thus, a smaller mf is associated with
more science-base industries, and a smaller mu with academic departments whose interests
are more applied.
As expressions (1) and (2) make explicit, the source of conict between the two parts lies
on how applied is the research, in comparison with what is individually preferred. The type
of project, x; then becomes an important decision variable, and the results depend on the
relative value of mf in comparison with mu: For the sake of simplicity, I consider mu < mf ;
and discuss how results change for the remaining cases (mu = mf ; and mu > mf). Also
for questions of simplicity in notation, M0 =
Bf
Bu mu represents the ratio of market-scientic
values at x = 0; and S1 = BuBf mf the ratio of scientic-market values at x = 1:
The market value VF , and the scientic value VU are, however, achievable only in the
case of a successful outcome for the research project. In the alternative scenario of a failure,
the project brings no value for the partners. The probability of each outcome depends on
the e¤orts exerted by the partners. Through collaboration, each party benets from the
e¤ort exerted by the other party. Assume p is the probability of a success, while (1  p) the
probability of a failure, where p depends positively on the e¤orts that both collaborators
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exert:
p = kef + (1  k)eu: (3)
The variable ei denote the e¤ort exerted by party i, while the parameter k represents the
substitution rate of ef by eu. I consider ei 2 (0; 1) ; and k 2 (0; 1).
Each institution i bears a cost Ci associated to a certain e¤ort level ei, given by:
CF =
cf
2
e2f ; (4)
CU =
cu
2
e2u: (5)
The cost coe¢ cients ci 2 R+ are such that cf > k (Bf +Bu   ~m) and
cu > (1  k) (Bf +Bu   ~m) ; with ~m = min (mf ;mu) :4
For simplicity of notation, consider RU =
(1 k)2cf
k2cu
the benet-cost ratio of the Universitys
e¤ort relative to the Firms e¤ort, while RF = 1RU :
Using (1), (3), and (4), the Firms expected gain from developing a research project
together with the University, EF , is described by:
EF = pVF (x)  CF : (6)
Using (2), (3), and (5), the Universitys expected reward from collaborating is:
EU = pVU(x)  CU : (7)
As far as the structures for governing the partnership are concerned, I consider two
possible alternatives: a centralized, and a decentralized ones. The main di¤erence between
these two structures of governance relies on who decides over the main characteristics of the
collaboration (type of project, e¤orts): either one of the parties, decentralized structure; or a
third entity, which considers the aggregate interest of the two partners, centralized structure.
Under the centralized structure, the Firm and the University (after agreeing to collabo-
rate) create a separate entity, the Consortium, to manage the collaboration. The Consortium
chooses the best joint project x, and if possible also the amount of e¤ort that each partner
should exert in the project (ef ; eu). Both, type of the project and resources, are settled
by contract. Nevertheless, informational constraints may prevent the contractibility of the
e¤orts of the partners. I consider di¤erent scenarios, regarding the veriability of e¤orts:
both (ef ; eu) are veriable, only one is, none is.
Consortiums objective is to maximize the joint expected net benet of the collaboration,
EW = EF+EU : As explicit in this objective, I assume the Consortium gives equal weight
to each of the partners.
4In this domain for ci we guarantee that ef and eu always lay in the interval (0; 1) :
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The sequence of the actions under centralized structure is: rst, the Consortium decides
over the collaboration characteristics; second, partners exert e¤ort; third, Nature plays,
deciding whether the project is successful or not, and nally each partner receives its revenues
from the research.
Under the alternative decentralized structure, the relation is promoted by one of the
parties. Instead of a common manager, it is now one of the collaborators who chooses the
project to be jointly developed, and presents it to the other party. For simplicity of the
analysis, I consider the e¤ort exerted by the party promoting the collaboration is always
veriable. However, the e¤ort that the other party devotes to the common project may be
contractible or not. I then consider two alternative scenarios: rst, when the e¤ort of the
other party is veriable, and second when it is not. In the former scenario, the promoter of
the collaboration designs a contract dening the project type, x; and the e¤orts. In the later
scenario, the promoter only decides x and its own e¤ort. Once the collaboration proposal is
accepted, each partner allocates its resources to the common project. Finally, Nature plays,
deciding whether the project is successful or not, and each partner receives its revenues from
research.
Table 1 presents the summary of the several contexts, as well as the notation used after-
wards to identify each di¤erent situation.
Information / Management Consortium Firms initiative Universitys initiative
Both (ef ; eu) veriable  1FG 1UG
Only ef veriable AU 2FG non  applicable
Only eu veriable AF non  applicable 2UG
Both (ef ; eu) non-veriable AUF non  applicable non  applicable
Table 1: Di¤erent contexts to analyze.
Under the management of the Consortium, four alternative contexts are taken into ac-
count, namely situations  (rst-best), AU; AF; AUF . When the Firm governs the collab-
oration, its e¤ort ef is always assumed veriable, and the only informational change relates
with the veriability of eu. As a consequence, under Firms initiative there is only two rele-
vant contexts: 1FG and 2FG: Similarly, when is the University governing the collaboration,
the two contexts to take into consideration are 1UG and 2UG:
Outside option Instead of collaborating, each party has the possibility to develop the
research by its own, alone.5 Research alone, however, translates in a small probability of
5In a more general setup, we could just consider as alternative for collaboration, a (general) action for
each party, that would yield a payo¤ of ui (also general). By considering the specic case of doing research
alone, we not only endogenize results, but also gain some insights on the comparison of the two research
scenarios (alone and with collaboration).
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success, or a higher cost, or both.
When the Firm develops research alone, its choice solves the following problem:
max
fx;efg
EF = pFVF (x)  CF ; (8)
where pF = kef is the probability of a successful outcome: In the optimal solution, the Firm
develops the project type x = 0; exerts an e¤ort ef;alone =
kBf
cf
; and obtains an expected
prot of EF;alone =
k2B2f
2cf
:
Similarly, when the University performs research without collaboration, it succeeds with
probability pU = (1  k) eu: The best solution is to exert an e¤ort of eu;alone = (1 k)Bucu for
the project type x = 1: This yields an expected benet of EU;alone =
(1 k)2B2u
2cu
:
Comparing (8) and (6), the Universitys e¤ort has a positive externality over Firms
expected gain (and vice-versa). Departing from a situation of doing research alone, collab-
oration represents an increase in the total expected gain, for a given project type x: The
issue, however, is the opposite interests of the parties towards x: As a result, the decision of
whether to collaborate or to develop research alone involves a trade-o¤: on the one hand,
doing research alone enables to select the most preferred project; on the other hand, under
collaboration, the partner contributes to the success of the project. When the benet-cost
ratio of the Universitys e¤ort (RU) is high, academics contribution to the success is rela-
tively high. In this case, we expect the Firm to be more willing to collaborate. Conversely,
the University prefers collaboration when the e¤ort of the Firm is relatively important for a
success, that is, when RF is high. The calculus conrm this intuition.
The aim of this paper, however, is to focus in the role of incentives on the outcome of
collaboration. Therefore, and for the sake of simplicity, I postpone the presentation and
discussion of the exact participation constraints to the Appendix.
In the next section, I present the collaboration outcomes, once adopting Sub-game Perfect
Nash Equilibrium as the solution concept.
3 Collaboration Outcomes
3.1 Consortium Governance
The outcome of the Consortium governance depends on the veriability, hence contractibility,
of the resources that each partner devotes to the joint project.
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3.1.1 First-best: both e¤orts are veriable
In the rst-best scenario, the Consortium veries the e¤ort of both partners and, therefore,
includes them in the collaboration contract. Knowing the impact that the resources of each
partner has on the expected revenue of the project, the Consortium asks e¤ort levels that
equate their marginal cost to their marginal revenue. Proposition 3.1 presents the optimal
joint project.
Proposition 3.1 When the e¤ort of both partners is veriable, their optimal level depends
on the total value of a successful project:
ef =
k
cf
[VF (x) + VU (x)] ;
eu =
1  k
cu
[VF (x) + VU (x)] :
In this situation, the maximum joint expected gain from collaboration is
EW  =
1
2
"
k2
cf
+
(1  k)2
cu
#
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x]2 : (9)
Considering mf > mu; the best project is the one with the highest market value, that is, the
most applied research.
At the optimal level of e¤orts, the maximum joint expected gain from collaboration is
convex in the type of project x; and therefore the optimal joint project is located at one of
the extremes of the line, x = 0 or x = 1: When mf > mu; the stakes of the Firm are higher
than of the University, meaning that the Firm looses more from a less applied project, than
the University looses when deviating from its most preferred basic research. As a result,
the sum of the expected gains is maximized when the Consortium decides to implement the
most applied project. Figure 2 represents the situation.
0 1 x
EW*
Figure 2: Joint expected gain with veriable e¤orts, when mf > mu:
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In the opposite case, when mf < mu, the loss in the scientic value from a less basic
project would be the largest, and the best choice would be at x = 1: In a third (alterna-
tive) case of mf = mu; any project in the interval [0; 1] would be equally preferred by the
Consortium.
The next corollary presents comparative statics results for the rst-best scenario.
Corollary 3.1 In the rst-best collaborative scenario (Consortium, and veriability of both
e¤orts):
1. the optimal research project does not change with the parameters k; ci; or Bi (for
i = f; u): As long as mf > mu; the optimal project is always the one with the highest
market value;
2. the maximum joint expected gain from collaboration increases with: i) a greater relative
importance of the Firms e¤ort for the success of the project, k; as long as k > cf
cf+cu
;
ii) a smaller cost coe¢ cients, ci; iii) a higher market or scientic values, Bi; and iv)
a smaller marginal loss in the scientic value due to a less basic project, mu:
When the e¤orts of the partners are contractible, the Consortiums decision internalizes
the positive e¤ect that the e¤ort of each partner has on the expected gain of the other.
The optimal decision for the e¤orts, then, depends on the sum of both market and scientic
values. This implies that the optimal type of project x only depends on how it a¤ects that
sum of values, that is, on the relation between mf and mu: A change in the remaining
parameters does not a¤ect this reasoning.
When k increases, the Firms e¤ort becomes relatively more important for the success of
the project and, therefore, the optimal ef increases. Since an increase in k is equivalent to a
decrease in (1  k) ; for the University the opposite holds, that is, the optimal eu decreases.
Considering the increase in Firms e¤ort, it has both a positive impact on the probability
of success, and a negative impact of enhancing the costs. The decrease in the Universitys
e¤ort has opposite e¤ects. When k > cf
cf+cu
() 1   k < cu
cf+cu
, the positive e¤ects of the
changes in the e¤orts dominate and, as a consequence, EW  increases.
When one of the cost coe¢ cients ci increases, the optimal level of ei decreases. This
translates into a smaller probability of a success, and hence in a reduction of EW : Also,
when Bi increases, a successful project brings a larger benet, hence a larger expected gain
EW :
Finally, a University with more applied interests, characterized by a smaller mu; gets a
higher scientic value at the rst-best research project x = 0. As a result, the maximum
possible EW  is higher.
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3.1.2 At least one e¤ort is non-veriable
When the e¤ort exerted by one or both of the parties is non-veriable, its choice of e¤ort
dedicated to the common project depends on its individual interest. At the rst stage, the
Consortium takes into account those interests of the partners, when choosing the type of
project to be jointly developed. Considering the following pairs of regions of parameters, the
next proposition states the result:
Region 1AU : M0 >
mf
mu
  1 and RU > (mf mu)(M0+1)muM0 (mf mu) ;
Region 2AU : otherwise.
Region 1AUF : M0 >
mf
mu
  1 and RU > (mf mu)M0+mfmuM0 (mf mu) ;
Region 2AUF : otherwise.
Proposition 3.2 The level of e¤ort that each party i exerts depends on its veriability:
if ei is veriable, ei =
ki
ci
[VF (x) + VU(x)] ;
if ei is non-veriable, ei =
ki
ci
Vi(x);
where ki = k for i = F; or ki = 1  k for i = U .
The best joint collaborative project chosen by the Consortium also depends on the (non)
veriability of the e¤orts, according to the following rule:
Optimal project
Non-veriable e¤ort x > 0 x = 0
only eu Region 1AU Region 2AU
only ef never always
both eu; ef Region 1AUF Region 2AUF
.
Furthermore, in Region 1AUF we have 0 < xAUF < xAU :
Figure 3 plots the results related with the choice of the project:
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Figure 3: Consortiums optimal project with eu non-veriable (AU), with ef non-veriable (AF ),
and with both eu and ef non-veriable (AUF ).
When resources are non-contractible, the Consortium knows that the more benet a
partner obtains from a project, the larger is the amount of resources it is willing to allocate
to that project. When the non-contractible resources of a partner are specially important
for the expected joint benet of the collaboration, the Consortiums best option is to deviate
from its rst-best project and to approach the interests of that partner. The increase in the
probability of success compensates the decrease in the total value of a successful outcome,
and hence the expected benet increases. More specically:
- when eu is non-veriable, the University is not willing to devote as much resources for an
applied project as it would be jointly preferred. In Region 1AU , the relative market
value of the invention M0 is su¢ ciently high, meaning that a successful project brings
a relatively high market value. Also in Region 1AU , the benet-cost of the Universitys
e¤ort RU is su¢ ciently high, meaning that the Universitys resources are important for
the success of the collaborative research. Both conditions ensure that the Consortium
is sensible to academicspreferences. Since a research project closer to the Universitys
interests acts as an incentive for its e¤ort, the Consortium prefers to select a less
applied (more basic) project than in the rst-best solution;
- when the Firm contributes with non-contractible e¤ort for the joint project, it does not
consider the positive externality that its e¤ort has on the Universitys expected gain.
As a result, the Firm chooses to exert less e¤ort than it is jointly desirable. In order to
reduce as much as possible the impact of such individualistic approach, the Consortium
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prefers a project closer to the Firms interests. Given mf > mu; the rst-best project
is already the most preferred of the Firm, thus no further distortion can be made.
This means that, under mf > mu and veriability of Universitys e¤ort, the best joint
project is exactly the same as in the rst-best scenario;
- in the presence of a double moral-hazard, the divergence of preferences creates an ambi-
guity on how to use the type of project as an incentive mechanism. The result depends
on whose e¤ort is more important for the success of the project and how valuable is
such success. In Region 1AUF ; a successful result brings a su¢ ciently high relative
market value (high M0); and the University is relatively important for such outcome
(high RU). Therefore, in Region 1AUF ; Universitys interests dominate and x is more
basic than in rst-best.
In the case of double moral-hazard, the e¤ort of the Firm is also non-contractible. In
order to motivate it, the Consortium chooses a more applied project than in the case
where only Universitys e¤ort is non-veriable.
Figure 4 depicts the comparison of best projects for the Consortium as well as the ex-
pected joint benet, under the di¤erent informational contexts, for parameters in Region
1AUF .
1 x
EWAU
xAUxAUF
EW*
EWAUF
EWAF
0=
= x* = xAF
Figure 4: Optimal joint expected gain under rst-best (EW ), moral hazard from one of the
partners (Firm, EWAF ; University, EWAU ), and double moral-hazard (EWAUF ).
I now present some comparative statics results for the collaboration outcome, when Uni-
versitys e¤ort is non-contractible.
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Corollary 3.2 Under non-veriability of Universitys e¤ort, the best collaborative project in
Region 1AU becomes closer to the Universitys interests when: i) Bf increases, thus increasing
the market value of the invention; ii) Bu decreases, thus decreasing the scientic value of
the publication; iii) the importance of the Firms e¤ort for the success, k; decreases; iv) the
Firms e¤ort becomes more costly, higher cf ; v) the Universitys e¤ort becomes less costly,
smaller cu; vi) the loss in the market value of a less applied invention, mf ; decreases; vii)
the loss in the scientic value of a less basic publication, mu; increases.
A higher market value, Bf , increases the importance of the Universitys involvement in
the research, to ensure a larger probability of success. The Consortium selects a project closer
to Universitys interest, as an incentive mechanism for eu: Conversely, when Bu increases,
the higher scientic value of the research already acts as a motivation for the University.
The optimal collaborative project can be more applied, closer to the rst-best.
When k decreases, the Firms e¤ort becomes relatively less important for the success of
the project, whereas for the University the opposite holds. In order to induce a higher eu;
the Consortium chooses a less applied project.
With a higher coe¢ cient cost cf , the optimal level of Firms e¤ort decreases. A smaller
ef means a smaller probability of success. This reduction may, however, be partially com-
pensated by increasing the Universitys e¤ort. In order to induce such larger involvement of
the University, the project becomes more basic research, that is, x increases. The inverse
happens, x becomes more applied, when the Universitys e¤ort is more costly, through a
higher cu.
A smaller marginal loss mi means that partner i experiments a smaller loss, when the
project is di¤erent from its most preferred. When mf is smaller, the impact on the market
value of the invention due to a less applied project is smaller and, therefore, Consortium
may a¤ord to choose a project closer to the Universitys interests. Conversely, a smaller mu
is linked with a smaller loss in the scientic value whenever the project is more applied. In
this case, the Consortium prefers a more applied project.
When it is possible to establish transfers between partners, the incentive for the involve-
ment of a partner in the joint project may also come through a share in the revenue of
the other partner. The next proposition formalizes this result, for the case when only the
Universitys e¤ort is non-veriable, and academics receive a share tf 2 [0; 1) of the market
value of a successful invention. We consider the two following regions of parameters:
Region 1AUT : M0 >
mf mu
mu mf(2 tf)tf
and RU >
(mf mu)(M0+1)
[mu mf(2 tf)tf ]M0 (mf mu)
;
Region 2AUT : otherwise.
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Proposition 3.3 With non-veriability of the Universitys e¤ort, if the University receives
a share of the market value from a successful project, the joint optimal project is closer to
the rst-best. In particular, in Region 1AUT ; the joint preferred type of project is between the
rst-best and the one chosen when no share is given. In Region 2AUT ; the project is exactly
the rst-best.
When eu is non-veriable; denote by xAUT the best project when the University receives
a share tf , and by xAU the best project when tf = 0. Figure 5 presents the proposition, in
Region 1AUT :
1 x
EWAU
xAUxAUT
EW*
EWAUT
0= x*
Figure 5: Joint expected gain in the rst-best (EW ), and under Universitys moral-hazard (with
transfer, EWAUT ; without transfer, EWAU ).
Region 1AUT emphasizes the high market value of a successful research (highM0), as well
as the relative importance of the University for such success (high RU). Under this region,
the Consortium selects a less applied project than in the rst-best, in order to motivate
academicse¤ort. Making the University also a beneciary of a successful invention is an
alternative way of motivating its scientists. As a result, the higher is tf , the closer is the
research to the rst-best. Nevertheless, the higher is tf ; the lower is the remaining share
for the Firm. The boundary level of Firms expected gain that still makes it willing to
collaborate dictates the optimum value of tf :
An alternative way of comparing both situations, with and without transfer, is to analyze
both regions 1AUT and 1AU : Since Region 1AUT Region 1AU ; the conditions ensuring xAUT >
0 are more restrictive than the ones for xAU > 0.6
Similarly, when only the Firms e¤ort is non-veriable, it is jointly benecial to transfer
a share of the Universitys revenue to the Firm. This transfer would not change the optimal
6Figure 9, in the Appendix, represents these two regions.
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project chosen by the Consortium (since it is already the rst-best x = 0), but it increases the
amount of e¤ort that the Firm is willing to exert in the collaboration. As such, it enhances
the joint expected gain.
3.2 Decentralized Governance
Under a decentralized governance structure, one of the parties involved, the Firm or the
University, proposes to the other the joint development of a research project. The governing
party designs a contract with the characteristics of the relation, which the other party can
accept or reject. Apart from dening the type of the common project and the e¤ort of the
party in governance, the contract may also specify the amount of resources that the second
party should devote to it. This specication of e¤ort may or not be possible, depending on
their veriability. I analyze both cases: when the e¤ort of the other party is veriable, and
when it is not.7
3.2.1 Firms governance
When eu is veriable, the Firm proposes to the University a contract that species the
type of project and the amount of e¤ort that the academics must exert. The freedom of the
Firm in designing the contract is, however, limited by the outside option of the University.
The following proposition states the result, considering two regions of parameters:
Region 1PU : RF >
m2u[m
2
f (2Bu mu)+muB2f ]
2m2f (Bu mu)[mf (Bu mu)+muBf ]
;
Region 2PU : otherwise.
Proposition 3.4 When Universitys e¤ort is veriable and the Firm designs the collabora-
tive contract, the University earns as much as in its outside option of developing research
alone. In Region 1PU , the Firm proposes its most preferred project x = 0: In Region 2PU ,
the Firm proposes a more basic project, x > 0:
Due to divergences in the preferences and the existence of an outside option for the
University, the Firm may face some constraints in selecting its most preferred project under
collaboration. As long as its contribution for the success is relatively more important than
the Universitys contribution (high benet-cost ratio of the Firm RF , or equivalently, low
RU), the Firm selects x = 0: This is the case in Region 1PU : There, the damage that an
7Under the decentralized governance, the e¤ort of the party in governance is considered veriable. Intro-
ducing non-veriability of this e¤ort, would induce an additional incentives contraint. Since this increase in
complexity of qualitative results would not have a qualitative impact, the veriability assumption is kept.
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applied project causes to the University is completely compensated by the increase in the
probability of success when collaborating with the Firm.8
When eu is non-veriable, the Firms best contract takes into consideration not only the
participation constraint of its partner, but also the role of incentives of a more basic project
towards inducing a higher eu: Considering the two following regions, the next proposition
states the result:
Region 1FG: M0 >
mf
mu
and RU >
mfM0
muM0 mf ;
Region 2FG: otherwise.
Proposition 3.5 Under non-veriability of Universitys e¤ort, the Firm may propose a less
applied project than its most preferred one, to increase Universitys involvement. This is the
case in Region 1FG; where x > 0: In Region 2FG; the Firm chooses exactly its most-preferred
project, x = 0.
In Region 1FG; a successful research brings a su¢ ciently high relative market value (high
M0), and the relative contribution of the University for such success is signicantly high
(high RU). Under such conditions, the Firm chooses a less applied project than its most
preferred, that is, x > 0; to motivate Universitys e¤ort.
3.2.2 Universitys governance
When ef is veriable, the collaboration contract that the University designs is only
constrained by the willingness of the Firm to participate in such joint project. When the
relative importance of the Firm to have a successful project is high (high RF ), its participa-
tion constraint induces the University to choose a less basic project than its most preferred.
Otherwise, the University proposes the joint development of x = 1, and a level for ef that
makes the Firm (almost) indi¤erent between collaboration and its outside option.
When ef is non-veriable, the choice of the project becomes an instrument to motivate
Firms involvement in the common project. Considering the two following regions, the next
proposition states the result.
Region 1UG: S1 > mumf and RF >
muS1
mfS1 mu ;
8As stated in the Model section, in this paper the focus is the role of incentives for the outcome of
collaboration. As Proposition 3.4 shows, however, participation constraints can also a¤ect the outcome of
collaboration. Future work may enlarge this discussion.
21
Region 2UG: otherwise.
Proposition 3.6 When the University governs the collaboration and Firms e¤ort is non-
veriable, the chosen project may not be the Universitys most preferred, as a way to motivate
Firms e¤ort. In Region 1UG the project is more applied than the Universitys most-preferred,
x < 1. In Region 2UG; the University chooses x = 1.
In Region 1UG, the relative scientic value of a discovery (S1), as well as the Firms
importance for such success (RF ) are high enough to make the University sensible to Firms
interests. As a result, the best option for the academics is to propose the joint development
of a less basic project than its most-preferred. By doing so, the University gives an incentive
to a higher e¤ort of the Firm and, hence, increases its own expected gain.
3.3 Comparison of outcomes: Centralized vs Decentralized gov-
ernance
From the previous analysis, we may conclude that the type of research under collaboration
can be used as an incentive tool, both under centralized and decentralized structures of
governance. Nevertheless, the optimal project is not always the same for both structures.
In fact, when the Firm governs the collaboration and selects a less applied project than its
most-preferred (and rst-best), it is also true that a Consortium facing moral-hazard from
the University also prefers x > 0: Taking into account the conditions that ensure x > 0 for
the centralized context with either moral-hazard from the University (situation AU) or dou-
ble moral-hazard (situation AUF ), and for the decentralized context with Firms initiative
(situation F ), we conclude that: Region 1FG Region 1AUF Region 1AU : Furthermore, the
following corollary holds:
Corollary 3.3 In the Region 1FG; it is possible to establish the following comparison between
optimal research projects: 0 < xF < xAUF < xAU :
Figure 6 below presents this corollary as well as the expected joint gain for the di¤erent
scenarios, considering parameters in Region 1FG.
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Figure 6: Joint expected gain under Consortium (EW ; EWAU ; EWAUF ), and under Firms
governance with non-veriable eu (EW
F ).
A similar reasoning can be developed for x = 1: Comparing University and Consortium
governance, having the University choosing a less basic project than individually it would
prefer, is a su¢ cient condition for all the remaining projects being also smaller than 1.
4 Policy Intervention: Prize
From the previous section, it is clear that informational asymmetries on the amount of
e¤ort that each partner decides to allocate to the common project, a¤ect the outcome of
such collaboration. In order to reduce the negative impact of a moral-hazard problem, the
governor of the relationship (either the Consortium or one of the partners) may decide to
deviate from its most preferred project. An additional way to reduce ine¢ ciencies arising
from the moral-hazard problem is to allow a monetary transfer between partners. In this
section, I analyze a third mechanism to motivate the partners to dedicate more resources for
the collaboration: through (public) prizes.
Given that raising public funds is costly, society is only willing to give an extra-reward for
the collaborative research, when the associated benets more than compensate.9 In the case
of a research project, these benets can be several. In the framework of the present paper,
all the benets are already considered in the values of the project. Nevertheless, society
may still be interested in promoting a more e¢ cient outcome by increasing the reward of a
9As explicit in the model and common in the literature, the cost of public funds relates not only to the
decrease of resources somewhere else, but also to distortions that such decrease creates (La¤ont & Tirole,
1993).
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successful project developed under collaboration, that is, by giving a prize. The conditions
presented here under which this public intervention is optimal, may then be consider as a
lower boundary for those cases where other benets for society may exist.
The previous analysis of collaboration outcome considers two alternative governance
structures: centralized and decentralized. It has been shown that the centralized structure
allows to obtain a higher joint expected gain and, hence, leads to a more e¢ cient outcome.
The conditions under which society prefers to give an extra-reward for the collaboration with
centralized governance, are then su¢ cient to ensure that society also prefers to intervene un-
der a decentralized structure. Therefore, I only focus on giving an extra-reward (prize) for
research collaboration with Consortium governance.
Let z  0 represent the prize for the research that is already collaborative, and  2 R+
be the cost of such public funds: Considering that both market and scientic values reect
all the benets from a research project, a Social Planners objective function is represented
by:
ES = p (VF + VU + z)  CF   CU   (1 + ) zp
= p (VF + VU   z)  CF   CU :
The probability of success p; the market and scientic values of a successful outcome, VF and
VU ; and the cost of resources involved, CF and CU ; are the same as dened in the Section 2
(expressions (3), (1), (2), (4), and (5), respectively).
Let us consider the case where the Social Planner has the capability to dene both the
total amount of the prize, z; and the fraction that each party receives:  2 [0; 1] is the
fraction for the Firm, whereas (1  ) the fraction for the University. After observing the
Social Planners decision, the Consortium decides on the type of project to develop, and on
the amount of resources to allocate, in a similar way as before.
The objective functions for the Firm, the University, and the Consortium are now, re-
spectively:
EF = p (VF + z)  CF ;
EU = p [VU + (1  ) z]  CU ;
EW = EF + EU :
When both e¤orts are veriable and, hence, contractible, the Consortium chooses the project
x = 0; whether there is or not a prize. Since the Consortiums decision does not consider
the cost of the public funds, ; the possibility of having a prize leads to excessive levels of
e¤ort, from the social point of view. Therefore, in the symmetric information case, the best
social solution is not to give a prize to collaboration.
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When the involvement of at least one the collaborators is non-contractible, however, it
may be optimal to give a prize for such partner. The prize not only motivates the non-
contractible e¤ort, but also allows to choose a project that is closer to the rst-best. Next
proposition states the result.
Proposition 4.1 When the e¤ort of at least one of the partners is non-veriable, its e¤ort
is su¢ ciently important for the success of the project, the success of the project is su¢ ciently
valuable, and the cost of public funds is not very high, it is optimal to give a prize to such
partner.10
In case of a double moral-hazard, either  = 0 or  = 1; that is, it is never socially
optimal to simultaneously give a prize to both partners.
Furthermore, with a prize, the optimal project comes closer to the rst-best.
When only Universitys e¤ort is non-veriable, the Consortium may motivate the Uni-
versity for a higher involvement by choosing a project closer to its most-preferred, as seen in
the previous section. Under such scenario, the prize has the double impact of increasing the
resources involved in the research, and of approximating the project type to the rst-best
(x = 0): When the cost of collecting public funds is not very high, the socially optimal
solution is to attribute a prize to the University, which acts as an incentive substitute of a
more basic research.
When only Firms e¤ort is non-veriable, the Consortium chooses the most applied re-
search, independently of the existence or not of a prize. When the cost of public funds is
not very high, however, it may be socially desirable to attribute a prize to the Firm. Such
intervention increases the involvement of the Firm in the collaborative research to an amount
closer to the rst best, thus improving the probability of a successful outcome.
When the e¤orts of both partners are non-veriable, the previous arguments justify the
allocation of a prize for their involvement on the collaborative project. Nevertheless, only one
of the two partners should receive the extra-reward. When RU is high, the University e¤ort
is relatively more important for a successful outcome. Giving a prize to academics increases
the amount of resources that they are willing to devote for the collaboration project and,
hence, the expectation of a joint gain enlarges. Conversely, when RF is high, the prize should
be given to the Firm.
10In the Appendix, the proof of the proposition makes explicit the upper boundary of  compatible with
the prize of each partner.
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5 Generalization
In this section, I show that the results of the previous Sections 3 and 4 are robust to more
general specication of the model.
As before, let us consider one University and one Firm, with single-peaked preferences
over the type of research projects. The two most preferred projects (one for each party) are
the two extremes of a line of unitary measure. A point x 2 [0; 1] in this line identies a
research project.
In case of a successful outcome, a project developed under collaboration translates in an
invention for the Firm and in a scientic publication for the University. The invention has
a market value VF (x) ; and the scientic publication has a scientic value VU (x) : VF is a
decreasing function of x, while VU is an increasing function of x, and each of these functions
Vi is non-convex on x; i.e., @VF@x < 0,
@VU
@x
> 0, @
2Vi
@x2
 0 for i = F;U:
In case of a failure, the projects brings no value for any of the two parties. The probability
of success depends on the e¤ort that each party exerts to the project, p (ef ; eu), increasing
and non-convex in each of the arguments: @p
@ei
> 0; @
2p
@e2i
 0:
For exerting an e¤ort ei, party i has a cost Ci (ef ; eu), where @Ci@ei  0; @
2Ci
@e2i
 0:
As far as second-order e¤ects are concerned, let us consider three alternative cases:11
1. complementarity of e¤orts, both in the probability of success and in the costs: @
2p
@ei@ej
>
0; @
2Ci
@ei@ej
< 0;
2. substitutability of e¤orts: @
2p
@ei@ej
< 0; @
2Ci
@ei@ej
> 0;
3. independence of e¤orts: @
2p
@ei@ej
= 0; @
2Ci
@ei@ej
= 0:
The remain structure of the model, namely in terms of governance and veriability of
e¤orts, is the same as before.
Consider, rst, a centralized structure of governance. When both e¤orts are veriable,
the decision problem of the Consortium is:
max
fx;ef ;eug
EW = p (ef ; eu) [VF (x) + VU (x)]  CF (ef ; eu)  CU (ef ; eu) ;
11The two initial alternatives (complementarity, and substitutability) are dened in strict sense (with strict
inequality). The results for the weak complementarity and weak substitutability (with weak inequality) can,
afterwards, be easily deduced.
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subject to the participation constraints of both parties. When such constraints are satised,
collaboration is preferred to a situation where both parties do research alone. The solutions
for the Consortium problem follow as:
ei :
@p
@ei
(ef ; eu) [VF (x) + VU (x)] =
@Ci
@ei
(ef ; eu) +
@Cj
@ei
(ef ; eu) ; (10)
x : p (ef ; eu)

@VF
@x
+
@VU
@x

= 0; (11)
where i; j = F;U , and i 6= j:
With the specic functional forms of Section 2, namely assuming linearity of the values Vi
towards the type of project x, the best research is either a corner solution or undetermined.
Nevertheless, as condition (11) emphasizes, once we leave the linearity assumption, it may
also appear interior solutions x 2 (0; 1).
When the e¤ort of one of the parties is non-contractible, its level is individually decided
by that party:
eAii :
@p
@ei
(ef ; eu)Vi (x) =
@Ci
@ei
(ef ; eu) :
The optimal decision of the Consortium becomes:
eAij :
@p
@ej
(ef ; eu) [VF (x) + VU (x)] +
@p
@ei
@ei
@ej
(ef ; eu)Vj (x)
=
@Cj
@ej
(ef ; eu) +
@Ci
@ej
(ef ; eu) ; (12)
xAi : p (ef ; eu)

@VF
@x
+
@VU
@x

+
@p
@ei
@ei
@x
(ef ; eu)Vj (x) = 0: (13)
Comparing (12) and (13) with the previous (10) and (11), respectively, is visible the
existence of a new term (hereafter, called external e¤ect), due to the inuence of the choices
of the Consortium on the non-contractible e¤ort of party i. The following proposition then
holds:
Proposition 5.1 Assume the e¤ort of party i is non-contractible. When the external e¤ect
of ei in the choice of project is strong enough, the Consortium distorts its rst-best decision
towards the most preferred project of party i.
When both e¤orts are non-veriable (double-moral-hazard), the distortion of the project
is towards the preferences of the party causing the higher external e¤ect.
In terms of e¤orts, if only e¤ort i is non-contractible, the Consortium chooses an e¤ort
for j that is:
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 higher than in rst-best, when e¤orts are complementary,
 smaller than in rst-best, when e¤orts are substitutes,
 equal to the rst-best, when e¤orts are independent.
Consider now the decentralized structure of governance. Party j is responsible to dene
the characteristics of the research collaboration and its own e¤ort ej, but the e¤ort of party
i is non-contractible. The optimal decision of party j is given by:
ejGj :
@p
@ej
(ef ; eu)Vj (x) +
@p
@ei
@ei
@ej
(ef ; eu)Vj (x)
=
@Cj
@ej
(ef ; eu) ; (14)
xjG : p (ef ; eu)
@Vj
@x
+
@p
@ei
@ei
@x
(ef ; eu)Vj (x) = 0: (15)
When the decentralized governance faces moral-hazard from its partner, the external ef-
fect is present. Nevertheless, since under decentralized governance the decisions are individ-
ually taken, the value of the external e¤ects are smaller than with Consortiums governance.
This implies the following result.
Proposition 5.2 Assume that the e¤ort of party i is non-contractible. When the external
e¤ect of ei in the choice of project is strong enough, party js governance may distort its rst-
best decision towards the most preferred project of party i. Nevertheless, comparing with a
Consortium governance, the decentralized governance of j always choose a project closer to
j0s preferences.
6 Discussion and Implications of the Results
Research collaboration between rms and universities brings mutual gains through enhanc-
ing the probability of achieving discoveries valuable for both partners. Cultural and goals
divergences may, however, become obstacles for the interaction of the two parties. The re-
sults in the present paper help to predict the sustainability and outcomes of collaboration,
in the presence of those divergences. These results focus on four main ideas.
First, when the resources of a partner are non-contractible, choosing a project closer to the
interests of this partner is a way of inducing it to exert a higher e¤ort for the common project.
With more resources being devoted to the project, a successful outcome is more probable.
Although the initial distortion of the characteristics of the project could a¤ect negatively the
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value of the outcome, the increase in the probability of a success may compensate that. As a
result, the expected return of the project may be higher. My analysis shows that distortion
of the characteristics of the project is worth when two conditions are satised: rst, when
the impact of non-veriable e¤ort is relatively more important for obtaining a success than
the e¤ort of the other partner; second, when the value of a successful outcome is su¢ ciently
large, in particular for the partner whose interests are damaged due to the change in project.
Second, changing the characteristics of a project is an incentive mechanism that may
enhance the expected gain of the collaboration, both under a centralized and a decentral-
ized structure of governance. Nevertheless, under a decentralized structure, the outcome is
always closer to the interests of the partner promoting the collaboration. As a consequence,
under decentralization, the collaboration holds a smaller expected gain than in the case of
centralization.
Third, besides changing the characteristics of the project, an alternative mechanism of
motivating the supply of e¤ort can be the establishment of a transfer between the partners.
In particular, when the partner whose resources are non-contractible receives a share of the
revenue of the other partner, the negative impact of the moral-hazard decreases. As a result,
the type of the project can be closer to the rst-best.
Fourth, society may be interested in giving an extra-reward to the collaboration, in order
to reduce the ine¢ ciency caused by moral-hazard. This is the case when the non-contractible
resources of one of the partners are relevant to obtain a successful result, and when the value
of a successful project is su¢ ciently high to justify policy intervention.
My claims support the empirical evidence that universities and rms tend to collaborate
in more fundamental, general-purpose research (e.g., Veugelers & Cassiman, 2005; Caloghi-
rou et al., 2001). Scientistsdedication and e¤ort to research is usually di¢ cult to verify
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1998), and therefore a university may be unable to commit on
the resources that it allocates for collaboration. The universitys involvement may, however,
be highly relevant for the success of a project. As such, my results show that it may be
optimal to develop a project whose characteristics are closer to academicsinterests. This
incentive mechanism is particularly suitable when the goals of the two partners are more
aligned (smaller marginal losses mi, in the language of the model). When that is the case,
the smaller is the reduction in the value of one partner by changing the characteristics of
a project towards the others interests, the smaller is the conict of interests in the part-
nership. For example, in the research agreement started in 1994 between the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and the pharmaceutical rm Amgen, this alignment of inter-
ests is perceived as the main reason for the viability of the relation. Initial doubts on how
di¤erent institutions would be able to jointly develop a project that would be benecial for
both partners, were not materialized due to the proximity of interests. In 2002, however,
the reverse happened. The shift in the goals of the rm towards a greater emphasis on
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marketing, raised serious concerns on the collaboration persistence (Lawler, 2003; Lacetera,
2006).
In my framework, I consider that the outcome of a successful research renders both mar-
ket and scientic values, respectively for a rm and a university. The analysis does not
directly deal with the problems that partners may face in appropriating those values. The
main justications for taking such approach is twofold. First, my aim is to focus on how
informational problems can a¤ect the outcome of a collaborative research between two dif-
ferent institutions. Second, there is no clear pattern on how intellectual property rights
a¤ect collaboration between rms and universities. Some authors nd no evidence that con-
cerns about appropriating the benets of new knowledge are an obstacle to the relationship
(e.g., Veugelers & Cassiman, 2005), while other authors nd that those concerns may be a
barrier to collaboration (e.g., Hall et al., 2001). Nevertheless, this issue can be addressed
in my framework. In the model, the variable x represents the basic research features of a
project that is valuable for the University. Academicsknowledge production is by nature
open to society, with no rivalry in its use, and often non-excludable (the "intellectual com-
mons" concept of Argyres & Liebeskind, 1998). Therefore, an additional interpretation for
x is to consider it a measure of how non-excludable is new knowledge of the project. As
x becomes smaller than one, the knowledge produced becomes more excludable (so further
from Universitys main goal), but with higher valuable commercial applications. As Argyres
& Liebeskind (1998) mention, biotechnology is an example of such type of research, where
excludability increases the private value of the knowledge, while decreasing the amount of
knowledge publicly available.
Considering this alternative interpretation for x; my results are also consistent with the
ndings of Zucker & Darby (1995). Analyzing cooperation between star bioscientists and
biotechnology enterprises, they nd evidence that as the expected commercial value of the
research increases and scientists receive a share from that value, they decrease the di¤usion
of the discoveries to other scientists. In the language of my model, this corresponds to
the result of Proposition 3.3: when University receives a share of the market value of the
outcome, the optimal type of project is closer to Firms interests (optimal x decreases).
6.1 Managerial Implications
The results of this paper bring concrete management insights for the collaboration between
rms and universities.
First, when a partner cannot commit on the amount of resources it dedicates to a common
project, it may be optimal to change for a type of research closer to the interests of that
partner. This is particularly so, when its involvement is relatively important to obtain a
successful outcome and the successful outcome brings a su¢ ciently high value, in particular
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for the partner feeling the external e¤ect.
Second, in case the change in the characteristics of the project is too costly and partners
do not agree on it, but still nd it worth to collaborate, the problem of non-commitment
of resources can be reduced by a higher interaction between the partners. This means that,
rather than considering the veriability of e¤ort, we may refer to the capacity of commitment
on a certain level of e¤ort. This is also the conclusion of the head of the pharmaceutical rm
Amgen, Gordon Binder, whose experience of successful collaboration with MIT was based
on regular joint research between Amgens researchers and MITs scientists: "What doesnt
work is to give a university a ton of money and then sit back to wait for useful returns"
(Lawler, 2003, page 331). Despite other benets that team work may have, when academic
scientists and the researchers of the rm work regularly together, it may be possible to
reduce the informational problems on the resources employed. Developing research in a team
environment, increases the possibilities of each partner to monitor the amount of resources
that the other partner devotes to the common project. When such higher accountability
is combined with a higher bargaining power of the partner whose interests are harmed
with the non-veriability of resources, then team work increases the expected gains of the
collaboration. This reasoning may explain the recent trend in companies collaboration
strategy, when moving from large-scale agreements to contracts with individual scientists
(Lawler, 2003).
From the point of view of the Firm, the research collaboration with individual scientists
may also be interpreted as a way to adopt a decentralized management strategy, under the
Firms initiative. As the results of the model show, in this scenario, the Firm is able to
implement a project closer to its interests.
Three more examples of research collaboration between a rm and a university reinforce
the relevance and application of my framework (the rst two examples are also discussed by
Lacetera, 2006).
Example 1, Novartis and Berkeley University:
In November 1998, the Swiss pharmaceutical Novartis established an agreement with
Berkeley University, California, under which the company paid $25 million over 5
years to the university. In exchange, the company had access to universitys plant
and microbial biology department labs and to scientic discoveries coming from the
university. In terms of my framework, this corresponds to a collaborative relation where
the e¤ort of the rm is veriable (money), but the resources of the university are not.
In fact, there was no explicit commitment from the university to devote its resources
for a common project, rst and above all, because there was no exact denition of
a common project, in particular there was no exact goal that the university should
fulll. In this scenario, it is natural to deduce that academic researchers would be
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work on projects closer to their own research interests, rather than to the interests of
the rm. In case of divergence of objectives between the two partners, we could expect
the outcome of the cooperation would be more valuable to the university than to the
rm. The reality conrmed those expectations. According to several comments both
from Berkeley University and from outsiders, the arrangement was a "terric (good)
deal for the university" (Robert Price, Berkeleys associate vice chancellor for research,
in Lawler, 2003) and "a bad deal" for the company (Lawrence Busch, Michigan State
University in East Lansing).
Example 2, DuPont and MIT Alliance, DMA:
In 2000, the American company DuPont and MIT established an agreement in the
areas of materials, chemical and biological sciences. The initial agreement of ve
years involved an investment of $35 million to develop new materials and processes at
bioelectronics, biosensors, biomimetic materials, and alternative energy sources. The
success of this rst interaction justied its renewal in 2005 for additional ve years
and to new areas as nanocomposites, nanoelectronic materials, and alternative energy
technologies. Two main reasons for the success of such collaboration were given: on
the one hand, the proximity of interests between the two partners (what in the model
is considered as a small value of the marginal loss mi); on the other hand, the working
methodology where both MIT faculty and DuPont colleagues dene together research
opportunities (a Consortium management, which as the model shows maximizes the
aggregate benets of the project).
Example 3, Rolls-Royce and Pusan National University (PNU):
The power systems provider rm Rolls-Royce established a research collaboration
agreement in January 2006 with PNU, to develop ultra-light weight heat exchang-
ers. The goal is to, jointly, develop technologies that will be applied to Rolls-Royces
engines for the aviation, marine and energy sectors. The most important headquar-
ters of the joint research are the existing Rolls-Royce University Technology Centres
(UTCs), and the rm expects the activity of PNU to be aligned with the one at the
UTCs (Rolls-Royce, 2006). In the language of my framework, this corresponds to a
decentralized governance, under the initiative of the rm. As expected, the purpose of
the project is closer to the interests of the rm. Nevertheless, the proximity of inter-
ests of the two parties (small mi), and a work methodology based on teams formed by
researchers from both partners are key ingredients for the success of this project.
Besides the insights on the management of collaboration between rms and universities,
the reasoning of my framework can also be applicable towards a better understanding of
the internal organization of research in the Firm. When developing research in-house, the
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Firm recruits scientists specialized in the eld. Nevertheless, the most qualied scientists
are often not very motivated to work in private rms, where they may face restrictions on
publishing and di¢ culties to pursue their academic research paths (Aghion et al., 2005). An
incentive mechanism to involve these scientists in the projects of the Firm, may then allow
them to continue publishing and use the Firms research results (at least partially) for the
development of their own academic agenda. In the language of the model, this corresponds
to a project whose characteristics are closer to academic scientistsinterests (higher x). As
a result, the smaller value of the outcome for the Firm (higher x implies smaller market
value VF ), may be compensated by an increase in the probability of success, due to a higher
involvement of the scientists (higher eu).
6.2 Policy Implications
From the policy point of view, my analysis delivers some implications. First, in the presence
of non-veriable resources in the collaboration between rms and universities, the negative
impact of the moral-hazard can be reduced by giving a prize to the collaborative research.
This is an optimal strategy when the cost of public funds is small as compared with the
expected benets of the project.
Second, as discussed, working in teams may increase the monitoring of partnerse¤ort.
Policy measures promoting the interaction of researchers from both institutions (or enhanc-
ing their mobility between rms and universities) may then have a positive impact on the
expected gains of collaborative research.
Third, the aggregate expected gain from collaboration is maximized under a centralized
governance, rather than a decentralized one. Policy measures that give incentives to the
former have a clear benet for society.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies how institutional di¤erences between business and academia a¤ect the
outcome of their collaboration in research. Distinct research goals is a source of disagreement
on the type of project to be jointly developed. When the amount of resources that one of
the parties shall employ is non-veriable, it may be optimal for the other party to agree on a
research that is not its most preferred type. The party with non-veriable resources is willing
to enhance its contribution, when collaboration is on a project closer to its interests. The
optimality of this incentive mechanism is conditional on two requisites. First, a su¢ ciently
high value of a successful outcome for the party feeling the externality e¤ect. Second,
a relatively high importance of the non-contractible e¤ort for the success. In comparative
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statics terms, the model predicts that when collaboration involves a more scientic-base rm,
the best joint project becomes closer to the most preferred of the university. Conversely,
when a university has more applied interests, the optimal research is less basic.
In the presence of a moral-hazard problem from at least one of the partners, incentives
may also come by means of monetary transfers. Without policy intervention, the collaborator
with non-veriable e¤ort should receive a share of the reward of the other party. This is the
best option, when the non-veriable resources are su¢ ciently important for the success of
the project. When the payment of transfers between collaborators is not possible, a policy
intervention may be in the interest of society. A prize to the non-contractible involvement is
welfare improving when the cost of public funds is not too large. Public intervention has two
positive e¤ects for collaboration: it increases partnerse¤ort, and it approaches the type of
project to the rst-best. By increasing the expected benet of collaboration, the intervention
reduces the negative impact of a moral-hazard situation.
The benets from basic research may have a long-term horizon. In my static model,
possible future gains from research are already taken into account, when we interpret both
market and scientic values of a successful outcome as the present value of a stream of
gains. An interesting extension of this analysis would be to consider a dynamic framework
with several periods of time, and myopic partners interacting in each period of time. If
the type of project today inuences the outcome tomorrow, there would be intertemporal
e¤ects probably not internalized by partners. The design of policy would then be particularly
important for the achievement of socially desirable result.
The present paper focus on incentives issues for a collaborative relation, that is already
formed. Further developments may bring interesting insights for a previous stage, when
partners select with whom they will develop such collaboration.
Empirically, also some work is still to be done. First, in terms of the predictions of the
current model. The general setting used enables the discussion of the characteristics of the
collaboration, in the presence of informational problems between partners who have di¤erent
interests. The direction of the predictions depends, however, on the value of the parameters.
Data on specic industries and on the prole of academics departments would allow to
concretize the results for particular cases. Second, on the role that the type and frequency
of interaction between partners may have on the outcome of the relationship. In fact, the
results of the present paper stress the role of the veriability of the e¤orts in obtaining a
higher expected gain. Following the basic fundaments of contract theory, veriability (and
hence, contractibility) of e¤orts is essential to guarantee their enforcement, during the period
of interaction. In everydays life, however, enforcement of e¤orts may also be related with
the capacity of the parties to commit on that level of e¤orts. Under such premises, a higher
and more frequent interaction between partners may favor this commitment capacity, thus
reducing the impact of a moral-hazard problem.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. When the e¤orts of both collaborators are veriable, the
Consortium decides over x, ef ; and eu in order to maximize the joint benet of the research
project, EW: The solution for the e¤orts is:
ef =
k
cf
(VF + VU) =
k
cf
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x] ;
eu =
1  k
cu
(VF + VU) =
1  k
cu
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x] :
These optimal level of e¤orts make EW  a convex function of x and, as a consequence, the
best joint project is at one of the extremes, 0 or 1. By mf > mu, the best choice is x = 0,
the Firms most preferred project:
This solution yields an expected gain for each collaborator of:
EF =
(Bf +Bu  mu)

cuk
2 (Bf  Bu +mu) + 2cf (1  k)2Bf

2cucf
;
EU =
(Bf +Bu  mu)

2cuk
2 (Bu  mu) + cf (1  k)2 (Bu  mu  Bf )

2cucf
:
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The Firms participation constraint is satised when RU is su¢ ciently high:
EF  EF;alone , RU 
cu (Bu  mu)2
2cfBf (Bf  Bu +mu) :
That is, when the role of the Universitys e¤ort for the success of the project is su¢ ciently
important, the Firm prefers to collaborate rather then to develop research alone.
Conversely, the Universitys participation constraint is satised when:
EU  EU;alone , RF 
cf

B2f +mu (2Bu  mu)

2cu (Bu  mu) (Bf  Bu +mu) :
Proof of Corollary 3.1.
1. When both e¤orts are veriable, the joint expected gain from the collaboration is
convex on x: As a result, the corner solution that maximizes EW only depends on the
relation between mf and mu: When mf > mu holds, the rst best choice is always
x = 0; no matter how the parameters of the model change inside their domain.
2. When both e¤orts are veriable, the maximum joint expected gain from the collabo-
ration is
EW  (0) =
1
2
"
k2
cf
+
(1  k)2
cu
#
(Bf +Bu  mu) :
From this, we can verify that
@EW  (0)
@
= [k (cf + cu)  cf ] (Bf +Bu  mu)
2
cfcu
;
which is positive when k >
cf
cf + cu
;
@EW  (0)
@cf
=   k
2
2c2f
(Bf +Bu  mu) < 0;
@EW  (0)
@cu
=  (1  k)
2
2c2u
(Bf +Bu  mu) < 0;
@EW  (0)
@Bf
=
@W  (0)
@Bu
=
1
2
"
k2
cf
+
(1  k)2
cu
#
> 0;
@EW  (0)
@mu
=  1
2
"
k2
cf
+
(1  k)2
cu
#
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof is made for each informational context, in
separate.
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Scenario 1: Only eu is non-veriable. When the Consortium cannot contract on eu, the
Universitys best choice is given by:
max
feug
EU = [kef + (1  k) eu]VU   CU :
The solution to this maximization problem is eAUu =
1 k
cu
VU =
1 k
cu
(Bu  mu +mux) <
eu: Anticipating this decision, the Consortium maximizes the total collaboration gain
by choosing:
ef =
k
cf
(VF + VU)=
k
cf
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x] ;
xAU =
cuk
2 (mf  mu) (Bf +Bu  mu) + cf (1  k)2 [(mf  mu) (Bu  mu) muBf ]
cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
:
The best research project in this context, xAU ; is positive (more basic than in the
rst-best) whenever Bf >

mf
mu
  1

(Bu  mu)()M0 > mfmu   1 and
RU >
(mf mu)(Bf+Bu mu)
muBf (mf mu)(Bu mu)
() RU > (mf mu)(M0+1)muM0 (mf mu) : Furthermore,
RU >
(mf mu)(M0+1)
muM0 (mf mu)
is also su¢ cient for having EWAU concave on x; and therefore,
the solution is a maximizer of EWAU .
Figure 7 represents the situation.
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u
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m
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u
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Figure 7: Consortiums optimal project when eU is non-veriable, xAU :
When RU <
(mf mu)(Bf+Bu mu)
mu(Bf mf) (mf mu)Bu
; we additionally have xAU smaller than 1. This means
that, although the optimal project is less applied than in the rst-best, it does not go to the
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opposite extreme. The University is important to ensure the success of the research, but its
contribution is not su¢ ciently strong to convince the Consortium to choose x = 1:
With the solution
 
ef ; e
AU
u ; x
AU

; the collaborators reward is:
EAUF =
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2 (1  k)2
2cu

k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
2 2k4c2u (mf  mu)mu+
+2 (1  k)4 c2f (mf  mu)mu   (1  k)2 k2cfcu (mf   2mu)2
	
;
EAUU =
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2 (1  k)2
2cu

k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
2 

n
(1  k)2 cf + k2cu
2
m2u   k4c2umf
o
:
The Firms participation constraint is satised when
(1  k)6 c2f

2 (mf  mu)mu [RF +RU ]  (mf   2mu)2
	 
 Bf

k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
2
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2
:
This means that the Firm is more willing to collaborate when k is smaller (Universitys
contribution for the success is larger), and Bf is smaller (the opportunity cost from not
developing its most preferred project is not too large).
Conversely, the individual rationality constraint of the University is satised when
[RU + 1]
2mu  mf 
Bu

k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
2
k2cu [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2
;
that is, for small k (Universitys higher importance for the success makes the choice more
favored to its own preferences), and for small Bu (the opportunity cost from not developing
Universitys most preferred project is not too large).
Scenario 2: Only ef is non-veriable. At the second-stage, Firms optimal choice is eAFf =
k
cf
VF =
k
cf
(Bf  mfx) :
At the rst stage, the Consortium decides on Universitys e¤ort eu =
1 k
cu
(VF + VU) =
1 k
cu
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x]. The joint expected gain becomes
EWAF =
k2
2cf
VF (VF + 2VU) +
(1  k)2
2cu
(VF + VU)
2 :
Depending on the value of the parameters, EWAF can either be convex or concave. The two
possible situations are:
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1. if mf > 2mu or RU >
mf(2mu mf)
(mf mu)2
; EWAF is convex on x; and the best project chosen
by the Consortium can only be one of the extremes. At x = 0 and x = 1; we
have, respectively,
EWAF (0) =
k2
2cf
Bf [Bf + 2 (Bu  mu)] + (1  k)
2
2cu
(Bf +Bu  mu)2
=
"
k2
2cf
+
(1  k)2
2cu
#
(Bf +Bu  mu)2   k
2
2cf
(Bu  mu)2 ;
EWAF (1) =
k2
2cf
(Bf  mf ) (Bf  mf + 2Bu) + (1  k)
2
2cu
(Bf  mf +Bu)2
=
"
k2
2cf
+
(1  k)2
2cu
#
(Bf +Bu  mf )2   k
2
2cf
Bu:
Given mf > mu, the best research project is x = 0.
2. if mf < 2mu and RU <
mf(2mu mf)
(mf mu)2
; EWAF is concave on x: The type of project
that maximizes EWAF is then
x =
cuk2[(mf mu)Bf+mf (Bu mu)]+cf (1 k)2(mf mu)(Bf+Bu mu)
cf (1 k)2(mf mu)2 cuk2mf(2mu mf)
; which is negative and
out of the decision domain. Comparing EWAF (0) with EWAF (1), we conclude
that the best option is x = 0:
This means that, whether EWAF is convex or concave on x; the optimal project is always
x = 0 (as long as mf > mu).
At x = 0; the expected gain of both parties is
EAFF =
k2Bf
2cf
+
(1  k)2Bf (Bu  mu)
cu
;
EAFU =
k2Bf (Bu  mu)
cf
+
(1  k)2 (Bu  mu)2
2cu
:
Since EAFF >
k2Bf
2cf
; the participation constraint of the Firm is satised. For having the
University willing to participate in the collaborative research project, it is necessary that
EAFU >
(1 k)2Bu
2cu
, RU < 2(Bu mu)mu(2Bu mu) :
Scenario 3: Both eu and ef are non-veriable. At the second stage of this double moral-
hazard situation, each partner chooses its most preferred e¤ort: the Firm chooses
eAUFf =
k
cf
VF ; and the University eAUFu =
1 k
cu
VU : Given mf > mu, the joint expected
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gain EWAUF is concave on the type of the project for RU >
mf(mf 2mu)
mu(2mf mu)
. In this range
of parameters, the Consortium selects
xAUF =
1
cuk2mf (mf   2mu)  cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

cuk2 [Bf (mf  mu) +mf (Bu  mu)] +
cf (1  k)2 [(mf  mu) (Bu  mu) muBf ]
	
:
When RU >
(mf mu)M0+mf
muM0 (mf mu)
andM0 >
mf
mu
 1 (Region 1AUF ), the project is more basic
than in the rst-best: xAUF > 0: Figure 8 presents this result.
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Figure 8: Consortiums optimal project under double moral-hazard.
At xAUF ; the expected prots of the partners are:
EAUFF =
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2

k2cumf + (1  k)2 cf (mf  mu)

2cfcu
 k2cumf (2mu  mf ) + (1  k)2 cfmu (mu   2mf )2 
 2 (1  k)4 c2fm2u + k4c2umf   (1  k)2 k2cfcu (mf  mu) ;
EAUFU =
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2
 k2cu (mf  mu) + (1  k)2 cfmu
2cfcu
 k2cumf (2mu  mf ) + (1  k)2 cfmu (mu   2mf )2 
 2k4c2umf + (1  k)4 c2fmu + (1  k)2 k2cfcu (mf  mu) :
To have both participations constraints satised, we must have R
¯ u
< RU < RU ; where
R
¯ u
solves EAUFU >
(1 k)2Bu
2cu
; and RU solves EAUFF >
k2Bf
2cf
:
1. The best joint project under double moral-hazard is less basic than the one chosen
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with only moral-hazard from the University, since
xAU   xAUF = k
2cumu

(1  k)2 cfmu   k2cu (mf  mu)
 k2cumf (2mu  mf )  (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu) 
 [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]
k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
 :
and, therefore, xAU   xAUF > 0 in Region 1AUF :
Proof of Corollary 3.2. From the Consortium best choice when only Universitys
e¤ort is non-veriable, the optimal project for Region 1AU is:
xAU =
cuk
2 (mf  mu) (Bf +Bu  mu) + cf (1  k)2 [(mf  mu) (Bu  mu) muBf ]
cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
:
From this expression, we can derive how the interior solution xAU changes with respect
to the di¤erent parameters:
- xAU is increasing in Bf ; @x
AU
@Bf
=
cuk2(mf mu) cf (1 k)2mu
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
> 0;
- xAU is decreasing in Bu; @x
AU
@Bu
=
[cuk2+cf (1 k)2](mf mu)
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
< 0;
- xAU is decreasing in k; @x
AU
@
=  2(1 k)kcf cumf(mf mu)[muBf+mf (Bu mu)]h
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
i2 < 0;
- xAU is increasing in cf ; @x
AU
@cf
=
(1 k)2k2cumf(mf mu)[muBf mf (Bu mu)]h
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
i2 > 0;
- xAU is decreasing in cu; @x
AU
@cu
=   (1 k)
2k2cfmf(mf mu)[muBf+mf (Bu mu)]h
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
i2 < 0;
- xAU is decreasing in mf ;
@xAU
@mf
= 1h
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
i2   (1  k)4 c2fmu (2Bf +Bu  mu) 
 k4c2u (mf  mu)2 (Bf +Bu  mu) 
  (1  k)2 k2cfcu [mu (3Bf + 2Bu   2mu) +mf (Bu  mu) 
2mfmu (Bf +Bu  mu)]g < 0;
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- xAU is increasing in mu;
@xAU
@mu
=
[cuk2+cf (1 k)2]h
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)
i2 
cuk2 (mf  mu)2 (Bf +Bu  mu)+
+cf (1  k)2 [2mfBu +mu (Bf +Bu) mfmu (mu + 2Bu)]
	
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.3. When the University receives a share tf 2 (0; 1) of the
market value, in case of a successful invention, the Universitys choice for its e¤ort is given
by:
max
feug
EU = [kef + (1  k) eu] (tfVF + VU)  CU :
From this, we obtain the optimal solution eAUTu 2
 
eAUu ; e

u

; with
eAUTu =
1  k
cu
(tfVF + VU) =
1  k
cu
(tfBf +Bu  mu   (tfmf  mu)x) :
Taking into account the Universitys behavior, the solution to the Consortiums maximization
problem comes:
ef =
k
cf
(VF + VU) =
k
cf
[Bf +Bu  mu   (mf  mu)x] ;
xAUT =
1
cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2 (mu   tfmf ) [(2  tf )mf  mu]

cuk2 (mf  mu) (Bf +Bu  mu)+
+cf (1  k)2 [(mf  mu) (Bu  mu)  (mu  mf tf (2  tf ))Bf ]
	
:
The expected gain to the Firm is then
EAUTF =
[muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2 (1  k)2
2cu

k2cu (mf  mu)2   (1  k)2 cfmu (2mf  mu)
2 2k4c2u (mf  mu) (mu   tfmf )+
+2 (1  k)4 c2f (mf  mu) (mu   tfmf )  (1  k)2 k2cfcu [(1 + tf )mf   2mu]2
	
:
The Firm is willing to collaborate when EAUTF is at least equal to
k2Bf
2cf
:
At tf = 1 
q
1  mu
mf
; this restriction is still not satised and, therefore,
tf 2

0; 1 
q
1  mu
mf

: Considering this interval for tf ; the best joint project is still less
applied than in the rst best, xAUT > 0; when
RU >
(mf mu)(Bf+Bu mu)
[mu mf(2 tf)tf ]Bf (mf mu)(Bu mu)
() RU > (mf mu)(M0+1)[mu mf(2 tf)tf ]M0 (mf mu) and
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Bf >
(mf mu)(Bu mu)
mu mf(2 tf)tf
() M0 > mf mumu mf(2 tf)tf : The rst condition emphasizes the impor-
tance of eu for the success of the project, whereas the second condition relates with the value
that a success has for the Firm (hence, to the Consortium). For these range of parame-
ters, the joint expected gain EWAUT is concave on x; guaranteeing that xAUT is actually a
maximizer for EW: In fact, the condition for a concave EWAUT is
RU >
(mf  mu)2
(mu   tfmf ) [(2  tf )mf  mu] ;
satised whenever xAUT > 0; because
(mf  mu) (Bf +Bu  mu)
[mu  mf (2  tf ) tf ]Bf   (mf  mu) (Bu  mu)  
(mf  mu)2
(mu   tfmf ) [(2  tf )mf  mu] > 0:
For tf 2

0; 1 
q
1  mu
mf

, the selected collaborative project can still be equal to the
rst-best. This happens when:
i) EWAUT is concave, but we are in Region 2AUT . In this case, we automatically have
xAUT < 0; and therefore the best possible project is x = 0;
ii) EWAUT is convex, but EWAUT (0) > EWAUT (1), which happens when the Firms con-
tribution for the success of the project is relatively more relevant than the Universitys:
RF >
mu (2Bu  mu) + 2 (Bfmu  Bumf ) mf tf (2Bf  mf ) (2  tf )
mf  mu :
The proof that xAUT < xAU for Region 1AUT comes from @x
AUT
@tf
< 0; since
@xAUT
@tf
=
(1  k)2
cu (DT )
22 (1  tf ) vf (BfDT + vfNT )
where DT (=denominator of xAUT ) < 0; and NT (=numerator of xAUT ) < 0:
Figure 9 bellow shows Consortiums optimal project when eu is non-veriable, both with
transfer tf (situation AUT ) and without transfer (situation AU). As told in the main text,
Region 1AUT Region 1AU .
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Figure 9: Consortiums optimal project when eU is non-veriable. With transfer tf : xAUT ;
without transfer: xAU :
Proof of Proposition 3.4. When the Firm governs the collaboration and the Univer-
sitys e¤ort is veriable, the design of the contract comes from the following optimization
problem:
max
fx;ef ;eug
EF = [kef + (1  k) eu]VF   CF ;
s.t.
(
EU = [kef + (1  k) eu]VU   CU  (1 k)
2B2u
2cu
;
0  x  1:
The rst-order conditions for this constrained maximization are:
ef =
k
cf
(VF + 1VU) ; (16)
eu =
1  k
cu
(VF + 1VU) ; (17)
[kef + (1  k) eu] (1mu  mf ) = 3   2; (18)
1 = 0 or EU =
(1  k)2B2u
2cu
; (19)
2 = 0 or x = 0; (20)
3 = 0 or x = 1; (21)
i > 0; i = 1; 2; 3: (22)
where i are the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints.
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Searching for the solutions of this problem that are relevant for the proof of the propo-
sition, several cases are possible:
case 1. 0 < x < 1 :
From conditions (20) and (21), 2 = 3 = 0: Replacing in (18), it comes 1 =
mf
mu
> 0:
Conditions (16) and (17) then state the optimal value for the e¤orts levels:
ef =
k
cf

Bf  mf + mf
mu
Bu

;
eu =
1  k
cu

Bf
mu
mf
+Bu  mu

:
By condition (19): 1 > 0; which means that the participation constraint of the Uni-
versity is biding: EU =
(1 k)2B2u
2cu
: The substitution of the solutions for ef and eu in
this situation gives the optimal type of project:
x =
1
2mfmu

k2cumf + (1  k)2 cfmu

[mu (Bf  mf ) +mfBu]

(1  k)2 cfm2u m2f (2Bu  mu) +muB2f 
 2k2cum2f (Bu  mu) [mf (Bu  mu) +muBf ]
	
:
when k
2cu
(1 k)2cf >
m2u[m2f (2Bu mu)+muB2f ]
2m2f (Bu mu)[mf (Bu mu)+muBf ]
that is, parameters are in Region 1PU ;
this solution is negative x < 0 which is out of the domain of x: In Region 2PU , x > 0
and the only concern is to compare this value of x with 1 (the upper bound in the
domain of x). In any case, in Region 2PU , 0 < x  1:
case 2. x = 0 :
From condition (21): 3 = 0. Replacing in condition (18), it comes
[kef + (1  k) eu] (1mu  mf ) =  2: (23)
Two alternatives then appear:
alternative 1. EU >
(1 k)2B2u
2cu
:
In this alternative, by condition (19), 1 = 0: But then, (17) gives eu = 1, which is
impossible.
alternative 2. EU =
(1 k)2B2u
2cu
:
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From this participation constraint, it is possible to obtain an expression of eu as a
function of ef :
eu =
(1  k) (Bu  mu) +
q
2kcu (Bu  mu) ef   (1  k)2mu (2Bu  mu)
cu
:
Replacing this expression in EF (ef ; x = 0) and maximizing in order to ef , we
obtain the optimal level of Firms e¤ort.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Under Universitys moral-hazard and Firms governance,
at the second stage, the University chooses its level of involvement in the collaboration, by
solving:
max
feug
EU = pVU   CU :
The optimal rule is eu = 1 kcu VU =
1 k
cu
(Bu  mu +mux) :
Anticipating this behavior, when the Firm purposes the collaboration, it chooses the
project and its level of e¤ort according to
max
fx;efg
EF = [kef + (1  k) eu]VF   CF :
From what we obtain: ef = kcf VF =
k
cf
(Bf  mfx). When RU > mf2mu , EF is a concave
function of x, and its maximum given by:
xF =
cuk
2Bfmf + cf (1  k)2 [mf (Bu  mu) muBf ]
mf

k2cumf   2 (1  k)2 cfmu
 :
xF > 0 for M0 >
mf
mu
and RU >
mfBf
muBf mf (Bu mu) ()
mfM0
muM0 mf ; that is, for parameters in
Region 1FG:
Since mfM0
muM0 mf >
mf
2mu
; the condition RU >
mfM0
muM0 mf is su¢ cient to ensure concavity.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Under Firms moral-hazard and Universitys governance,
at the second stage, the Firm chooses its level of involvement in the collaboration, by solving:
max
fefg
EF = pVF   CF :
The optimal rule is ef = kcf VF =
k
cf
(Bf  mfx) :
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Anticipating this behavior, when the University purposes the collaboration, it chooses
the project and its level of e¤ort according to
max
fx;eug
EU = [kef + (1  k) eu]VU   CU :
From what we obtain: eu = 1 kcu VU =
1 k
cu
(Bu  mu +mux). For RF > mu2mf , EU is a
concave function of x, and its maximum given by:
xU =
cuk
2 [mf (Bu  mu) muBf ]  cf (1  k)2mu (Bu  mu)
mu

cf (1  k)2mu   2cuk2mf
 :
xU < 1 for Bu
Bf mf >
mu
mf
() S1 > mumf and k
2cu
(1 k)2cf >
muS1
mfS1 mu () RF > muS1mfS1 mu ; that is,
for parameters in Region 1UG:
Since muBu
mfBu mu(Bf mf)
> mu
2mf
; the condition RF > muBumfBu mu(Bf mf)
is su¢ cient to ensure
concavity.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. From Proposition 3.2, 0 < xAUF < xAU in Region 1AUF :
Since Region 1FG Region 1AUF , then it trivially comes that 0 < xAUF < xAU in Region
1FG: Furthermore, in Region 1FG it also holds that xF   xAUF < 0; since
xF   xAUF =   [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]
24 k2
cf
mf   (1  k)
2
cu
mu
!2
+
(1  k)2
cu
k2
cf
35 :
Proof of Proposition 4.1. After observing the Social Planners choice of the prize and
the Consortiums choice of the type of project, the partner with non-veriable e¤ort decides
on its level of e¤ort. By backward induction, we obtain the equilibrium solution. Regarding
the non-veriability of e¤orts, we may have three di¤erent scenarios. The analysis, below,
regards each of these scenarios.
Scenario 1. Only the e¤ort of the University is non-veriable.
At the last stage, the Universitys problem
max
feug
EU = [kef + (1  k) eu] [VU + (1  ) z]  CU ;
has the solution eu =
(1 k)
cu
[VU + (1  ) z].
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At the previous stage, maximizing the joint expected gain, EW , the Consortium best
options are ef = kcf [VF + VU + z] and x
AU = 1
cuk2(mf mu)2 cf (1 k)2mu(2mf mu)

 fcuk2 (mf  mu) (Bf +Bu  mu + z)+
+cf (1  k)2 [(mf  mu) (Bu  mu) muBf   z (mu  mf (1  ))]
	
:
When M0 >
mf
mu
  1 and RU > (mf mu)(M0+1)muM0 (mf mu) ; we have x
AU (z = 0) > 0: This means
that, without the prize, the Consortium chooses a less applied project than in the rst-
best, as an incentive mechanism for the Universitys involvement in the collaboration.
Anticipating Consortiums reaction, the Social Planners objective function becomes
ES =
(1  k)2 (1  k)2 cf + k2cuDF
2cu

cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 ;
whereD = mu (z +Bf )+mf [(1  ) z +Bu  mu] > 0; and F =  D+2z (1 + )mu:
On a second-order condition for z at the maxES, we need @
2ES
@2z
< 0; where
@2ES
@2z
=
(1  k)2 (1  k)2 cf + k2cu
cu

cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

[(1  )mf + mu] [mu (2  + 2) mf (1  )] :
Since cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu) < 0 when xAU (z = 0) > 0; the
previous maximizing condition is satised for mu (2  + 2) mf (1  ) > 0:
From the rst-order condition for z; we obtain
@ES
@z
= 0() zAU = [(1  )mf   (1  + )mu] [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]
[(1  )mf + mu] [mu (2  + 2) mf (1  )] ;
which is strictly positive for (1  )mf   (1  + )mu > 0()
()  < (1  )

mf
mu
  1

:
Considering the optimal  for having the maxES;
@ES
@
=
(1  k)2 z (1  k)2 cf + k2cu (mf  mu)G
cu

cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 ;
where G = D   z (1 + )mu; with G > 0 for  < (1  )

mf
mu
  1

:
Since cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu) < 0 when xAU (z = 0) > 0; this
rst derivative is always negative, that is, ES is decreasing on : The solution for 
is, then, at the corner  = 0: This means that all the prize
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zAU =
[mf (1+)mu][muBf+mf (Bu mu)]
mf [2mu(1+) mf ]
; positive for mf
2mu
  1 <  < mf
mu
  1, should be
given to the University. As a consequence, the social benet is:
ESAU =
(1  k)2 (1  k)2 cf + k2cu [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2H
8 (1 + )2 cumfmu

cuk2 (mf  mu)2   cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 ;
whereH = mf+mfmu (1 + ) (2mf   3)+2mu (1 + )2 : Furthermore, the best project
is more applied with a prize than without it, since
xAU
 
 = 0; zAU

< xAU (z = 0) :
Scenario 2. Only the e¤ort of the Firm is non-veriable.
At the last stage, the Firms problem
max
fefg
EF = [kef + (1  k) eu] (VF + z)  CF ;
has the solution eAFf =
k
cf
(VF + z).
At the previous stage, maximizing the joint expected gain, EW , the Consortium best
options are eu = 1 kcu (VF + VU + z) and x
AF = 0:
Anticipating Consortiums reaction, the Social Planners objective function becomes
ES =
k2
cf
(Bf + z)

Bf
2
+Bu  mu  

+

2

z

+
+
(1  k)2
cu
(Bf +Bu  mu + z)

Bf +Bu  mu
2
 

+
1
2

z

:
From the rst-order condition for z;
@ES
@z
= 0() zAF =   (1  k)
2 cf (Bf +Bu  mu) + k2cu [ (Bu  mu)  Bf ]
(1 + 2) (1  k)2 cf +  (+ 2) k2cu
:
The rst-order condition to have an interior solution of  that maximizes ES is
@ES
@
= 0() k
2z2 [Bu  mu   z (+ )]
cf
= 0:
Substituting z by the previous expression of zAF ; we obtain that either zAF = 0; or
AF =  
2k2cuBf + (1  k)2 cf

(1 + )2 (Bu  mu) + 2Bf

 (Bf +Bu  mu)

(1  k)2 cf + k2cu
 < 0:
Since AF < 0 is out of the domain for ; we compare the three possible extreme
solutions:
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i) for AF = 0; the rst-order condition for z gives
zAF =
  (1  k)2 cf (Bf +Bu  mu) + k2cuBf
(1 + 2) (1  k)2 cf
< 0:
Since, by domain zAF  0; the closest solution to be considered is zAF = 0:
ii) for AF = 1; the rst-order condition for z gives
zAF1 =
  (1  k)2 cf (Bf +Bu  mu) + k2cu (Bu  mu   Bf )
(1 + 2)

(1  k)2 cf + k2cu
 :
When  < Bu mu
Bf
and RU <
Bu mu Bf
Bf+Bu mu ; z
AF > 0: In this case, the expected
social gain from collaboration is
ES
 
x = 0; AF = 1; zAF1

=
H
2 (1 + 2) cfcu

(1  k)2 cf + k2cu
 ;
where
H = (1  k)4 c2f (1 + )2 (Bf +Bu  mu)2 +
+k4c2u [Bu  mu + (1 + )Bf ]2 +
+(1  k)2 k2cfcu

(Bu  mu)2+
+2 (1 + )Bf [(1 + )Bf + 2 (2 + ) (Bu  mu)]] :
iii) for zAF = 0; the expected social gain from collaboration is
ES
 
x = 0; zAF = 0

=
1
2cfcu

k2cuBf (Bu  mu   Bf ) 
  (1  k)2 cf (Bf +Bu  mu)
	
:
Comparing ES
 
x = 0; AF = 1; zAF1

with ES
 
x = 0; zAF = 0

; we obtain that the former
is socially preferred.
In resume, when the Firms e¤ort in the collaborative project is non-veriable, the best so-
cial solution is to choose the most possible applied research xAF = 0:When the cost of
public funds is su¢ ciently small

 < 1
M0

and the Firms e¤ort is relatively important
for the success of the project

RU >
M0+1
1 M0

; a prize zAF1 =
 (1 k)2cf(Bf+Bu mu)+k2cu(Bu mu Bf)
(1+2)[(1 k)2cf+k2cu]
>
0 should be given. In this case, however, only the Firms participation should receive
the extra-reward
 
AF = 1

:
Scenario 3. Both e¤orts of the University and of the Firm are non-veriable.
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At the last stage, from the individual maximization problem of each partner, we obtain the
amount of resources that they are willing to allocate for the joint project:
eAUFu =
(1  k)
cu
[VU + (1  ) z] ;
eAUFf =
k
cf
(VF + z) :
Anticipating these choices, at the previous stage, the Consortium best option to max-
imize the joint expected gain, EW , is
xAUF =
1
cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

 cuk2 [(mf  mu)Bf +mf (Bu  mu) + z (mf   mu)] +
+cf (1  k)2 [muBf   (mf  mu) (Bu  mu) + z (mu  mf (1  ))]
	
:
When M0 >
mf
mu
  1 and RU > (mf mu)M0+mfmuM0 (mf mu) ; we have x
AUF (z = 0) > 0: This means
that, without prize, given the importance of the University for the joint project, the
Consortium prefers to choose a project closer to the academicsinterests. Therefore,
the chosen project is less applied than in the rst-best.
By backward induction, at the rst stage, the Social Planners objective function becomes
ES =   (1  k)
2 k2DI
2

cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 ;
where D = mu (z +Bf ) +mf [(1  ) z +Bu  mu] and
I =  D +RU [z (2  + 2)mu  D] + 1RU [2z (+ )mf  D] :
From the second-order conditions of maxES; with respect to z;
@2ES
@2z
< 0()
()   (1  k)
2 k2 [(1  )mf + mu] J
cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 < 0;
where J =   (1  )mf   mu + 1RU [(1 + + 2)mf   mu] +
+ RU [(2  + 2)mu   (1  )mf ] : When xAUF (z = 0) > 0; we have
cuk
2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

> 0, and therefore, the previous
condition is satised for J > 0:
From the rst-order condition of maxES; with respect to z;
@ES
@z
= 0() zAUF =   [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]L
[(1  )mf + mu] J ;
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where L =   (1  )mf   mu + 1RU [(+ )mf   mu] +
+RU [(1  + )mu   (1  )mf ] : Given that J > 0; a positive solution for zAUF
exists whenever L > 0:
Since the second derivative of ES with respect to  is given by
@2ES
@2
=
z2

(1  k)2 k2cfcu + k4c2u + (1  k)4 c2f

(mf  mu)2
cfcu

cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 > 0;
ES is non-concave with respect to : As a consequence, the optimal value for  must
be at one of the corners,  = 0 or  = 1:
The best social choice with respect to z and  is given by the comparison of ES under the
three possible alternatives:
i) at AUF = 0; the rst-order condition for z gives zAUF0 =
 [muBf+mf (Bu mu)]L0
[(1 )mf+mu]J0
;
where L0 corresponds to the value of L when  = 0; and J0 to the value of J when
 = 0: With such values for z and ; the expected social gain from collaboration
is
ESAUF0
 
AUF = 0; zAUF0

=
(1 + )2

k4c2umf + (1  k)4 c2fmu
2
2c2fc
2
umf (1  k)2 k2

 [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]
2
cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

J0
;
ii) at AUF = 1; the rst-order condition for z gives zAUF1 =
 [muBf+mf (Bu mu)]L1
[(1 )mf+mu]J1
;
where L1 corresponds to the value of L when  = 1; and J1 to the value of J when
 = 1: With such values for z and ; the expected social gain from collaboration
is
ESAUF1
 
AUF = 1; zAUF1

=
(1 + )2

k4c2umf + (1  k)4 c2fmu
2
2c2fc
2
umu (1  k)2 k21

 [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]
2
cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)

J
;
iii) at zAUF = 0, the expected social gain from collaboration is
ESAUF
 
zAUF = 0

=
(1  k)2 k2cucf [muBf +mf (Bu  mu)]2
h
1 + 1
RU
+RU
i
2

cuk2mf (2mu  mf ) + cf (1  k)2mu (2mf  mu)
 :
Then, the social best choice under non-veriability of e¤ort from both partners is:
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- to give a positive prize zAUF0 only to the University
 
AUF = 0

when
 < 1
2

mf
mu
  1

and RU 2

RU ; ~Ru0

; where Ru0 is the minimum value of RU
that satises both conditions
RU

1  mu
mf
(1 + 2)

+ 1 +
mu
mf
>
1
RU

1 + 2  mu
mf

(24)
and
RU

1  mu
mf
(1 + )

+ 1 >
1
RU
; (25)
and ~Ru0 is the maximum value of RU that still satises
RU

1  2mu
mf
(1 + )

+ 1 <
1
RU
(1 + 2) : (26)
Ru0 guarantees that the relative importance of the University is su¢ ciently high,
so that its e¤ort for the collaboration receives a prize (positive value of z): ~Ru0
creates an upper boundary for RU ; above which the existence of a prize for the
University has an impact in the cost of its e¤ort greater than the impact on the
expected revenue. As a consequence, below Ru0 the best is to subsidize the Firm,
whereas above ~Ru0 the best is to settle z = 0:
- to give a positive prize zAUF1 only to the Firm
 
AUF = 1

when
 > 1
2

mf
mu
  1

and RF 2

Rf1; ~Rf1

; where Rf1 is the minimum value of RF
that satises both conditions
RF

(1 + 2)
mf
mu
  1

+
1
RF

1 + 2  mf
mu

> 1 +
mf
mu
(27)
and
RF

2 (1 + )
mf
mu
  1

+
1
RF
(1 + 2) > 1; (28)
and ~Rf1 is the maximum value of RF that still satises
RF

(1 + )
mf
mu
  1

+
1
RF
 < 1: (29)
Rf1 guarantees that the relative importance of the Firm is su¢ ciently high so
that its collaboration receives a prize with a positive value of z: ~Rf1 creates an
upper boundary for RF ; above which the existence of a prize for the Firm has an
impact in the cost of its e¤ort greater than the impact on the expected revenue.
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Proof of Proposition 5.1. Comparing conditions (13) and (11), and since @p
@ei
> 0;
it becomes clear that the Consortium distorts its choice for the project towards the prefer-
ences of party i; whenever the external e¤ect caused by ei;
@p
@ei
@ei
@x
(ef ; eu)Vj (x) dominates:
over p (ef ; eu)

@VF
@x
+ @VU
@x

, when only ei is non-veriable; or over p (ef ; eu)

@VF
@x
+ @VU
@x

+
@p
@ej
@ej
@x
(ef ; eu)Vi (x) ; when both ei and ej are non-veriable.
When only ei is non-contractible, comparing conditions (12) and (10), we easily conclude
that:
 when e¤orts are complementaries, is reaction function ei(ej) is such that @ei@ej > 0: In
this case, the Consortium chooses a higher ej than in rst-best;
 when e¤orts are substitutes, is reaction function ei(ej) is such that @ei@ej < 0, Consor-
tium chooses a smaller ej than in rst-best;
 when e¤orts are independents, is reaction function ei(ej) is such that @ei@ej = 0, Con-
sortium chooses the same ej as in rst-best.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Comparing conditions (15) to (11), non-contractability of
ei creates an external e¤ect, on j0s decision on the type of project. In this situation, the gov-
erning party j is willing to distort its most-preferred project towards is interests, whenever
the external e¤ect @p
@ei
@ei
@x
(ef ; eu)Vj (x) dominates over p (ef ; eu)
@Vj
@x
: Nevertheless, comparing
conditions (15) and (13), it is visible that due to
p (ef ; eu) @Vj@x  < p (ef ; eu) @VF@x + @VU@x , a
decentralized governance always distorts less its rst-best project than a Consortium does.
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